and Rodgers and Neri (2007) both found that the research productivity of academic economists in Australia is a function of their human capital and characteristics of their departmental environment. Additionally, and of most relevance to this study, Fox and Milbourne (2006) found evidence of a positive human capital externality within departments. The authors collected survey data from 134 academics on their human capital and other characteristics, and on the institutional environment in which they worked. Human capital data included whether the academic had a PhD, the time taken to obtain the PhD and the grade of the Honours degree. Institutional data included average teaching hours per week, average class size and the average number of research grants held per year since the first appointment.
The authors calculated various proxy measures of the human capital of the coworkers of the academics who responded to the questionnaire, all based on their lifetime research output. These included the average annual research output of the most productive individual, of the three most productive individuals and of the most productive quartile in the relevant department. 2 This study seeks to test the robustness of this conclusion by using a direct, rather than a proxy, measure for the human capital of departmental co-workers.
The authors concluded, on the basis of Tobit regressions, that the coefficient on the proxy for the average human capital in one's department was statistically significant and positive: "...there are human capital externalities so that an increase in the human capital of any individual also raises, at the margin, the productivity of others. There is some evidence to suggest that the externality is driven primarily by having a small but critical mass of researchers, rather than one outstanding individual." (p. 369).
2 See Fox and Milbourne (1999) for details on the questionnaire used and the data thereby obtained.
Furthermore we test for the existence of a human capital externality for (nearly) all Australian academic economists rather than just a self-selected sample who responded to a survey. We also examine a different study period. In doing so, we confirm the existence of a positive human capital externality within Australian economics departments.
Finally we investigate the nature of the externality, that is, how the externality becomes manifest. Lucas (1988) conjectured that "...human capital accumulation is a social activity, involving groups of people in a way that has no counterpart in the accumulation of physical capital" (p.19, italics ours), and that "The external effects...have to do with the influences people have on the productivity of others, so the scope of such effects must have to do with the ways various groups interact..." (p.37, italics ours). In Lucas' scenario departmental colleagues interact because they believe that such interactions are subject to increasing returns. 3 The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we present and discuss our data. In section III we estimate an econometric model of the relationship between research productivity and a vector of human capital and other Of course workplace interactions take many forms, most of which are not directly observable. However departmental co-authorship, which may be regarded as a strong form of workplace interaction, is both observable and measurable. Indeed in at least one department of which we are aware research incentive schemes have been established to encourage such collaboration. Hence a second objective of this study is to estimate the relationship between academic economists' research productivity, the average human capital of the academics' departmental colleagues, and the academics' propensity to co-author with departmental colleagues. 3 We assume that professional interactions occur for the purpose of production rather than consumption.
variables, including the propensity of each individual academic to co-author with a departmental colleague. Finally, section IV concludes.
II Data

4
We identified all academics at the level of Lecturer (Level B) and above in 28 research active Australian economics departments during the period 1996-2000 and constructed a dataset of their research productivity and human capital. 5 We adjusted for publication time lags by assuming that a given publication was produced within the department stated in the affiliation if and only if the authors were members of the department two years prior to the publication year. However we classified publications as departmentally co-authored only if at least two of the co-authors appeared on one of our departmental staff lists.
6
We counted only refereed journal publications because we are interested in research of a minimum level of quality (Neary, Mirrlees and Tirole, 2003) . 4 See Neri and Rodgers (2006) and Rodgers and Neri (2007) for more details on data sources and construction methods.
Our major source of publications data was the on-line version of EconLit. This database is not without limitations (Pomfret and Wang, 2003) , a major one being that articles with several authors are frequently referenced using the 'et al.' convention.
Consequently relevant articles will be missed unless the first author is included in our staff list and a supplementary search is undertaken to reveal the other authors, a practice which we followed in every case. Each of n authors received credit for 1/n of the article.
We calculated departmental research productivity as the weighted average of the research productivities of its members, the weights being the number of years each member was in the department from 1996 to 2000. We assumed that longer articles imply a larger research output and so we took page counts but adjusted these for differences in the mean number of words or characters per page. 8 Any meaningful measure of departmental research productivity must also take account of journal quality which is particularly relevant here because co-authorship may be more common where colleagues attempt to publish in top tier journals. However, measuring journal quality is problematic.
9
Consequently we used two versions of our dataset on departmental research productivity. The first (which we term Q1) uses the impact factors for only the top 159 journals from Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas and Stengos (2003) . Ipso facto, this approach disregards publications in many other journals which are of insufficient quality. As relatively few Australian academic economists publish in top tier journals, and as we believe that an article in a refereed journal is better than no article at all, we also used the complete dataset (termed Q2) which includes a much broader range of journals based on information from Gibson (2000) and Towe and Wright (1995) .
Whilst there is likely to be disagreement over these journal lists and the quality relativities, any weighting scheme is to a greater or lesser extent ad hoc, and in any case our approach is explicit and replicable using alternate weights. Table 1 presents 8 Our analysis is based on 'standardised' pages calculated with page-conversion factors for 391 journals provided to us by Sinha and Macri (2002) . For other journals we used the average conversion factor of all 'group 4 journals' in Sinha and Macri (2002) . The reference journal, with a weight of one, is the American Economic Review. 9 See Neary, Mirrlees and Tirole (2003) , Figure 1 for an illustrative summary of the wide range of weighting schemes used in the literature to take account of journal quality. See also Combes and Linnemer (2003) , Lubrano et al. (2003) , Axarlaglou and Theoharakis (2003) , Mason, Steagall and Fabritius (1997) and Thursby (2000) .
(alphabetically) our departmental data on research productivity and on the percentage of that research output that was co-authored by (at least two) departmental colleagues. Column 2 of Table 1 shows the percentage of academics, department by department, with some Q1 publications during the study period. Because many academics in many departments did not publish at all, we present in Column 3 the Q1 research productivities of the subset of academics in each department who had positive publications. Column 4 contains departmental Q1 research productivities for all academics, which range from a minimum of zero to a maximum of 0.66 pages per person year. Whilst for all departments the productivity figures are much higher for the research active than for all members, in some cases by as much as sevenfold (e.g.
Macquarie and UTS), the data nevertheless highlight the fact that the large majority of Australian academic economists have low research productivity by international standards during the study period. Column 5 of Table 1 contains the proportions of the departmental Q1 outputs that were co-authored with departmental colleagues and the range is again very wide, from a minimum of zero percent to a maximum of 74.5%.
Columns 6-9 of Table 1 contain the corresponding data for Q2 publications.
Departments are more productive in terms of Q2 publications, with productivity of the research-active ranging from 0.19 to 5.40 pages per person per year (Column 7) and that of all members ranging from 0.05 to 2.77 (Column 8). Finally Column 9 contains the respective proportions co-authored by colleagues, the range being very similar to that for Q1 productivity.
Table 1 makes clear the fact that research productivity, whether measured for a restricted or a much broader collection of journals, was low on average across all departments and was driven in most departments by a relatively small group of active researchers. These data also suggest that attitudes or traditions towards co-authoring with colleagues within departments varied greatly. In some departments, as much as 75% of all journal articles were authored by departmental colleagues. In other departments, such collaboration was simply non-existent.
Of particular interest to us is whether departmental co-authorship, which can be regarded as a (strong) form of workplace collaboration, is positively related to research productivity. The last row of Columns 5 and 9 in Table 1 contains the simple correlation coefficients between, respectively, Q1 and Q2 departmental research productivities and the relevant proportions co-authored. In both cases there is a weak negative correlation between these two variables. Thus the research externalities identified by Fox and Milbourne are not manifest via co-authorship between departmental colleagues, at least not in simple correlations based on department-level data. In the next section we investigate this hypothesis using partial correlations based on data at the level of the individual.
III A model of research productivity
In this section we investigate the existence and nature of the human capital externality identified by Fox and Milbourne (2006) by estimating a model of the determinants of research productivity using data for individual academics. As a substantial proportion of academic economists in our data set have zero publications, we use a Tobit (Type I) model which allows for corner solutions. Equation (1) states the hypothesis that research output is related to human capital, research experience, a human capital externality, and some control variables as follows.
log(output) = max [lower limit, β 0 + β 1 phd1 + β 2 phd2 + β 3 phd3 + β 4 exp + β 5 (phd1*exp) + β 6 (phd2*exp) + β 7 gender + β 8 prof + β 9 aspro +β 10 resuni
The lower limit is set just below the logarithm of the smallest positive research output in the data set (see Cameron and Trevedi, 2009, Section 16.4.2) . 10 The dependent variable is the logarithm of research output because, unlike research output itself, the logarithm is approximately normally distributed over strictly positive output values (see Appendix 1). The error term, u, represents unobservable influences on output and is, by assumption, independent of the explanatory variables and Normal(0,σ 2 Human capital is represented by three dummy variables, phd1, phd2 and phd3, which equal one if, in the first year between 1996 and 2000 that the individual was employed in a given department, he or she had a PhD from an institution ranked 1-50, 51-150 or ≥151, respectively (in descending order of quality).
Several control variables are also included in the model. The binary variable gender, which equals one if female, controls for any productivity differences between male and female academic economists. Two binary variables attempt to control for research ability and ambition to climb the academic ladder: prof, which equals one if the individual was a professor when first observed in the department, and aspro which equals one if the individual was an associate professor when first observed and was Experience, exp, is the number of years between when the PhD was conferred and the last year between 1996
and 2000 that the individual was employed in the given economics department.
Individuals without a PhD have exp set equal to zero; they constitute the benchmark category to which others are compared. The two interaction terms allow experience to have a differential effect on research output, depending on the quality of the PhD.
10 The Tobit I model assumes that each explanatory variable has the same effect on the probability of publishing as on the (log of the) number of pages published, given some publications were achieved. We checked this following the procedure suggested by Wooldridge (2009, p.595) . A Probit model with the same explanatory variables was estimated and found to have coefficients with the same sign and of approximately the same magnitude as those of the Tobit I model. 11 We used the rankings of PhD granting institutions in Kalaitzidakis et al. (2003) . See Rodgers and Neri (2007) for more details.
awarded a PhD no more than ten years earlier. The binary variable resuni, which equals one if the individual is employed in a research-intensive university, takes account of broad institutional differences that might affect research productivity. 12 The variable, size, is the average number of academics in the department during the period 1996 through 2002. It is included to control for the effect of departmental scale on research productivity and on the propensity to co-author. Table 2 for Q1 output and Table 3 for Q2 output. The research intensive universities in our study are Adelaide, ANU, Melbourne, Monash, New South Wales, Queensland, Sydney, Tasmania and Western Australia. 13 The inclusion of the variable size takes account of the fact that large departments offer more opportunity for co-authoring than small departments. If productivity is inversely related to department size ceteris paribus, and if more co-authoring occurs in large departments than in small departments, then excluding size would create a downward bias in the estimated effect of co-authoring. 14 The APEs of the explanatory variables on the productivity of those economists who have some publications are given in Appendix 2. As expected they are larger than the APEs of the explanatory variables on the productivity of all economists but are interpreted similarly. There is a statistically significant difference between the effects of phd1 and phd2 and also between phd1 and phd3 on the production of Q1 publications. For example, compared with an economist with a PhD from an institution ranked 51-150, an economist with a PhD from a top 50 institution is predicted to have (e =) 7.4 times larger in the case of Q2 publications, than that of an economist without a PhD. These are large effects, but given the median number of Q1 pages per year is zero and the median number of Q2 pages per year is 0.041 (see Appendix 1) they are not unreasonably large. 2.8 times more Q1 research output per annum. However, the difference between the effect of phd2 and phd3 on Q1 productivity is not statistically significant in any of the specifications of the model. On the other hand, there are no statistically significant differences among the effects of phd1, phd2 and phd3 on Q2 research productivity.
-0.537 =) 0.6 and (e -0.302 =) 0. We now turn our attention to the existence of a human capital externality. Fox and Milbourne (2006) found that the research productivity of economists who responded to their survey increased with a proxy measure of the human capital of their departmental colleagues, namely their lifetime annual productivity. By contrast we use direct measures of human capital. In Tables 2 and 3 , Specification 2, the externality is measured using three variables: the percentage of one's departmental colleagues who have a PhD from a top 50 university (hc1_coll), from a university ranked 51-150 (hc2_coll) and from a university of lower rank (hc3_coll).
=) 1.7 times more Q2 pages per year, than other economists. However, in most other specifications the APE of resuni is much smaller and not statistically significant, the interpretation of which is explored below.
15
There is also a statistically significant positive human-capital externality in the production of Q2 research output although its size is quite small and varies little with This indicates that the externality is driven primarily by the most highly qualified subset of one's colleagues. 15 The residual category is the proportion of one's co-workers without a PhD.
the origin of the PhD: a one percentage point increase in the percentage of one's colleagues with a PhD from a top 50 university increases one's own Q2 productivity by 1.7 per cent while the APEs of hc2_coll and hc3_coll are 1.5 per cent and 1.2 per cent, respectively. All these effects are statistically significant at the 10 per cent level and two of them are statistically significant at the 5 per cent level.
The APE of working in a research-intensive university, which is large and highly significant in Specification 1, declines substantially in size and becomes statistically non-significant once the human-capital of departmental colleagues is included in the model. This suggests that resuni in Specification 1 is capturing the propensity of research-intensive universities to hire well trained academics; beyond that their effect on research productivity is little different to that of other universities.
Next, we consider an alternative, indirect measure of the externality, namely, the contemporaneous, rather than lifetime, productivity of co-workers, which is measured by the variable pub_coll. Unlike the Fox and Milbourne (2006) analysis, the use of pub_coll assumes that for a research externality to exist between two academic economists, the two people must be present in the same department during the same period of time. When pub_coll replaces hc1_coll, hc2_coll and hc3_coll in Specification 2 of Tables 2 and 3 we get Specification 3. The APE of pub_coll on Q1
productivity is large and highly significant: a one-page increase per annum in the Q1 output of departmental colleagues is associated with a 222.8 per cent increase in the individual's Q1 productivity. Once again, to put this in perspective keep in mind that on average academics have Q1 productivity of only 0.144 pages per annum and more than 50 per cent of academics have no Q1 output at all. The APE of pub_coll on Q2 productivity is smaller, though still statistically significant: a one-page increase per annum in the contemporaneous Q2 output of departmental colleagues is associated with a 25.3 per cent increase in the individual's Q2 productivity. The mean and median Q2 productivities of all academic economists in the data set are 0.807 and 0.041 pages per annum, respectively, which makes the APE of pub_coll a modest increase. This result implies that individuals with contemporaneously highly researchactive co-workers are more productive, ceteris paribus, than individuals with colleagues who are less contemporaneously research active. This result also confirms the conclusion of Fox and Milbourne (2006) , which is based on lifetime research output per year.
When pub_coll as well as hc1_coll, hc2_coll and hc3_coll are all included in the model, as in Specification 4, the APE of pub_coll on both Q1 and Q2 productivity is much reduced in magnitude compared with Specification 3 and is no longer statistically significant. There is evidently a positive relationship between the human capital and the research productivity of one's departmental co-workers because the APE of hc1_coll on both Q1 and Q2 productivity becomes smaller, and the latter is no longer significantly different from zero. However, the APEs of hc2_coll and hc3_coll on both Q1 and Q2 productivity are little changed in Specification 4 compared with Specification 2.
Although these results reinforce the conclusion of Fox and Milbourne (2006) that the externality is associated with the extent to which one's departmental colleagues are research active, the direct measure of the human capital of colleagues is better able to explain research productivity than the indirect measure.
Finally, we turn to the question of whether the human-capital externality becomes manifest via co-authoring. In Tables 2 and 3 , Specification 5, the variables pub_coll, hc1_coll, hc2_coll and hc3_coll in Specification 4 are replaced by the variable co-author, which is the percentage of each department's published pages that involve co-authoring with at least one colleague from the same department. We find no evidence that co-authoring affects research productivity. To the contrary, the APE of co-authoring on both Q1 and Q2 publications is very small and not remotely statistically significant. The APEs of the other explanatory variables are approximately the same as in Specification 2, with the exception of resuni, which is larger and marginally statistically significant.
Specification 6 includes both co-author and the human-capital measures. The APE effect of co-author on Q1 productivity remains small and statistically nonsignificant, as it was in Specification 5. The APEs of hc1_coll, hc2_coll and hc3_coll on Q1 productivity retain approximately the same magnitudes and levels of significance as in Specification 2. These outcomes suggest there is little relationship between the propensity to co-author and the human capital of one's colleagues. However, the situation is a little different with respect to Q2 productivity where the APE effect of coauthor remains small but becomes positive and statistically significant at the five per cent level. Also, the APEs of hc1_coll, hc2_coll and hc3_coll on Q2 productivity increase slightly and become more statistically significant in Specification 6 compared with Specification 2. This is consistent with a negative correlation between the humancapital of one's departmental colleagues and the extent of co-authoring within a department, This is the only result in support of the hypothesis that co-authorship enhances research productivity, although the effect is small, a one percentage point increase in the percentage of departmental output that is co-authored increases one's own Q2 productivity by 0.8 per cent.
IV Conclusion
This study investigated whether a human capital externality boosted the research productivity of academics in Australian economics departments from 1996 to 2000, as measured by the number of pages published per year in scholarly journals.
We extended the work of Fox and Milbourne (2006) by using a direct, rather than an indirect, measure of the human capital of one's departmental colleagues. Doing so, we conclude that a one percentage point increase in the percentage of departmental colleagues with a PhD from a top 50 university increases the individual's productivity by between two and four per cent on average, depending upon the quality of the journal outlet. We also found that the contemporaneous productivity of co-workers had a large effect on the individual's productivity, which supports the Fox and Milbourne (2006) assertion that the externality is associated with the extent to which one's departmental colleagues are research active. However, once we controlled for their educational qualifications the contemporaneous productivity effect was no longer apparent.
The way in which the externality becomes manifest remains unclear but, after controlling for other factors, we find no evidence that it does so via departmental coauthoring. Whilst there may be other reasons for encouraging collaboration between colleagues, this finding casts doubt on the efficacy of departmental research incentive schemes which seek to encourage co-authorship as a way of boosting research productivity.
It is possible that co-authoring is a response to workplace conditions or personal attributes that have a negative effect on productivity and which, not being included in the model, impart a negative bias to our measure of the effect of coauthoring on productivity. On the other hand, there are mechanisms other than coauthoring that are consistent with the existence of a human capital externality. For example, there may be demonstration effects, peer pressure effects or competition to out-publish one's colleagues among academics with high levels of human capital. 
